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wfx-loot GitHub Actions Attack: What Happened and How to Check Your Repos
Leaked secrets
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wfx-loot GitHub Actions Attack: What Happened and How to Check Your Repos

An attacker used stolen GitHub credentials to push a CI secret stealer into thousands of repositories, and an npm hook ran it through workflows teams already had.

Nullify Team
·
Disclosed
November 10, 2026
·
Updated
November 16, 2026

What happened in the wfx-loot attack?

In GitGuardian’s analysis, an attacker used stolen GitHub credentials to push the same CI secret stealer in four forms: a throwaway workflow, an injected step in an existing workflow, an npm postinstall hook, and code appended to a shell script a workflow already calls. GitGuardian counted 28,500 payload patches from 2,367 accounts across 17,715 repositories. A small precursor started on October 24, and the mass wave began at 12:45 UTC on November 10.

GitHub held the new and edited workflow files, and every run of those forms GitGuardian could observe never started. The npm hook changed only package.json and a root script, so existing workflows ran npm install and executed it. GitGuardian found public logs from 19 repositories where the script ran, and 18 reported successful exfiltration.

What does the wfx-loot payload steal?

  • Every repository and organization secret and variable, plus the job's GITHUB_TOKEN.
  • Tokens in process environments and runner memory, AI provider keys and common credential files.
  • On self-hosted runners, cloud metadata and runner credentials.
  • OIDC tokens for AWS, Azure and GCP, which it uses to create IAM keys and add federated credentials.

How to check if your repos are affected

  1. Search your organizations for a wfx-docs branch, a docs: dependency audit notes pull request, docs/wfx-audit.md, and commits titled ci: refresh build cache, ci: cache or chore: add ci helper.
  2. Check npm install logs for a sh ./.ci-*.sh line, and the audit log for workflow runs from those commits.
  3. Check developer machines that installed dependencies from an affected branch during the window.

What to do now

  1. If the payload ran, rotate every secret and variable the job could reach, not only the ones the workflow referenced.
  2. Look for cloud artifacts created since November 10: new IAM keys, changed trust policies, wfx-ci-* federated credentials, and Vault or Kubernetes access by GitHub OIDC identities.
  3. Revoke the compromised account's personal access tokens, OAuth and GitHub App grants and SSH keys, and review which bots can bypass branch protection.

Where Nullify fits

How Nullify Covers This Class of Attack

Direct
Secrets Detection

Nullify finds credentials in code and verifies which ones still work with the provider that issued them (AWS, GCP, Azure, GitHub, GitLab, Stripe and Slack), so live keys rank first, then routes rotation to each owner. Rotation happens with the provider; Nullify doesn't rotate keys.

Nullify doesn't detect whether the payload ran in your CI. Use the checks above for that.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is wfx-loot?

wfx-loot is a GitHub Actions secret-stealing campaign whose mass wave began on November 10, 2026. An attacker used stolen GitHub credentials to push a stealer into thousands of repositories as workflows, injected steps, npm hooks and shell scripts.

Did GitHub block the wfx-loot workflows?

GitHub held the new and edited workflow files, and GitGuardian saw none of those runs start. The npm postinstall form got through because it only changed package.json and a script, so existing workflows ran it during npm install.

What should I rotate after wfx-loot?

If the payload ran in a job, treat every secret and variable that job could reach as leaked, plus the GITHUB_TOKEN and any cloud roles reachable through OIDC. Then revoke the compromised account's tokens and app grants.

How do I find wfx-loot in my GitHub organization?

Search for a wfx-docs branch, a docs: dependency audit notes pull request, docs/wfx-audit.md and ci: refresh build cache commits, then check npm install logs for a sh ./.ci-*.sh line.

Update Log

  • Nov 16, 2026: page published with GitGuardian's counts as of November 12.

Check your own code for the bug behind this incident

Nullify's AI harness finds, proves and fixes the same class of vulnerability in your code and dependencies, and hands your team a merge-ready pull request.