What happened in the Trigger.dev security incident?
In its incident report, Trigger.dev says it received alerts about anomalous activity on November 1, 2026, identified it as malicious and blocked the attacker. The attacker had obtained root API keys for some customer environments. A root key gives full access to that environment's settings, including its environment variables.
In some environments the attacker also listed runs, deployments and schedules, which exposed metadata such as run and deployment IDs, task names, run status and schedule IDs. Trigger.dev says this affected 0.66% of customers, that self-hosted deployments weren't affected, and that it found no evidence of access to production databases or customer dashboard accounts. It revoked the exposed keys and says it will share the attack vector when appropriate.
Who is affected by the Trigger.dev incident?
- 0.66% of Trigger.dev cloud customers, who received emails on November 1 (around 21:36 UTC) or November 2 (20:27 UTC) and a dashboard banner.
- Environment variables in the affected environments.
- Not affected: self-hosted deployments and webhook signing secrets, which Trigger.dev says don't need to be rotated.
How to check if you're affected
- Look for Trigger.dev's impact email from November 1 or 2 and the banner in your dashboard. Trigger.dev says no notification means your organization wasn't affected.
- To confirm, email help@trigger.dev from your account email.
- Review provider logs for every credential stored in the affected environments.
What to do now
- Regenerate your Trigger.dev API keys. The exposed ones are already revoked.
- Rotate credentials stored in affected environments, including database passwords, third-party API keys and access tokens, and revoke the old ones with each provider.
- Consider the IP allowlisting for scoped API keys and the OIDC support Trigger.dev released after the incident.
What the Trigger.dev incident means for secrets stored in platforms
A deployment or AI platform that injects environment variables at runtime has to be able to decrypt them, so one compromise of its control plane or build system can expose every customer's keys at once. Treat platform-stored variables as copies of a credential, not as the credential's only home: keep an inventory of which keys live where, scope each key to the one service that needs it, set spend limits on AI provider keys, and make rotation a scripted step rather than a scramble. When a provider tells you to rotate, revoke the old key at the issuer, because deleting the variable from the platform doesn't invalidate it.
Where Nullify fits
How Nullify Covers This Class of Attack
Nullify finds credentials in code and verifies which ones still work with the provider that issued them (AWS, GCP, Azure, GitHub, GitLab, Stripe and Slack), so live keys rank first, then routes rotation to each owner. Rotation happens with the provider; Nullify doesn't rotate keys.
These secrets were stored in the platform, not in your code. Nullify's live-key check helps where the same keys also sit in your repositories or config.
Frequently Asked Questions
What happened in the Trigger.dev security incident?
On November 1, 2026, an attacker used root API keys for some Trigger.dev environments to read their environment variables and some run metadata. Trigger.dev blocked the attacker, revoked the keys and says 0.66% of customers were affected.
How do I know if my Trigger.dev account was affected?
Affected customers got an email on November 1 or 2, 2026 and a dashboard banner. Trigger.dev says no notification means you weren't affected, and you can confirm by emailing help@trigger.dev from your account email.
Do I need to rotate Trigger.dev webhook secrets?
No. Trigger.dev says webhook signing secrets weren't exposed and don't need rotation. Regenerate your API keys and rotate the credentials stored as environment variables in affected environments.
Update Log
- Nov 17, 2026: page published from Trigger.dev's November incident report.