What happened to @subql/common?
In its analysis, StepSecurity says commits on the subquery/subql repository replaced the publish workflow. The release step deleted packages/common and swapped in an unverified tarball from ci-artifacts.dev before npm publish, so @subql/common 5.8.3, published October 5, 2026, carries valid provenance.
StepSecurity says the payload runs on postinstall and on import, so disabling install scripts alone isn't enough. It collects .npmrc, .env, AWS, SSH and kubeconfig files, reads GitHub Actions runner memory, tries cloud secret stores and Vault, and opens a remote shell. These are static capabilities; theft from a specific host isn't confirmed. Seven other SubQuery packages can resolve to 5.8.3 without a new release.
Which SubQuery packages are affected?
@subql/common5.8.3. Version 5.8.2 doesn't contain the payload.- Parent packages whose ranges allow 5.8.3:
@subql/cli6.6.3,@subql/node-core19.3.1,@subql/query2.25.0 and@subql/node-ethereum6.5.0. - Indirectly:
@subql/node6.4.6,@subql/node-solana6.3.5 and@subql/node-starknet6.1.0.
How to check if you're affected
- Search lockfiles and dependency trees for
@subql/common5.8.3, including paths through the parent packages. - Look for
dist/project/readers/manifest-cache.jsand atmp.ts018051808.lockfile in the OS temp directory. - Check network logs for
ci-artifacts.dev, and repositories for unexpectedcodeql_analysis.ymlworkflows.
What to do now
- Exclude 5.8.3 from resolution, including transitive paths, and pin 5.8.2.
- Isolate and rebuild affected hosts and runners. Uninstalling doesn't stop the detached worker.
- Rotate CI, cloud, GitHub, npm, SSH, Kubernetes and Vault credentials, then review their recent use.
- Block
ci-artifacts.devat egress.
Why provenance didn't flag the bad release
Provenance attests that a package came from a given repository and workflow. When the attacker controls the workflow, the attestation is genuine and the package is still malicious. Treat changes to release workflows like changes to production deploy scripts: require review, protect the branch they run from, and alert when a workflow fetches build inputs from outside the repository.
Where Nullify fits
How Nullify Covers This Class of Attack
Nullify finds every repository and container image that pulls an affected package version and runs the upgrade as one campaign, scoped by CVE, package, repo or team, with owners, Slack escalation and SLA tracking. Your developers approve every merge.
Nullify can't tell you whether the payload ran on a given machine or runner. Use the checks above for that, then fix the dependency everywhere it appears.
Frequently Asked Questions
Which @subql/common version is malicious?
Version 5.8.3, published October 5, 2026. Version 5.8.2 doesn't contain the payload. Several SubQuery packages, including @subql/cli and @subql/node-core, can resolve to 5.8.3 through their version ranges.
Is uninstalling @subql/common 5.8.3 enough?
No. StepSecurity says the payload starts a detached worker that keeps running after uninstall. Isolate and rebuild affected hosts and runners, then rotate the credentials they could reach.
Why did @subql/common 5.8.3 have valid provenance?
The attacker modified the project's own release workflow to swap in an external tarball before publishing, so the provenance correctly points to that workflow. Provenance shows where a package came from, not whether the workflow was trustworthy.
Update Log
- Nov 17, 2026: page published from the primary sources linked above.