What happened in the Optimizely malicious JavaScript incident?
On November 16, 2026, Scott Helme of Report URI found malicious JavaScript being served to visitors of 178 organizations' websites through Optimizely Web, the experimentation tag many sites load on every page. In its analysis, Report URI says the attacker wrote a loader into the projectJS (Project JavaScript) field of customer projects. The rest of each snippet was unchanged, and the file was still served from cdn.optimizely.com with Optimizely's certificate, so it looked like normal first-party tag traffic.
Optimizely confirmed the incident on its status page at 01:02 UTC on November 17. It says an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in Experimentation to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects, and that it has fixed the vulnerability, removed the injected code, secured affected user accounts and added protections against unauthorized code delivery. Optimizely hasn't published how the vulnerability worked.
Timeline of the Optimizely attack
| Time (UTC, Nov 16) | Event, per Report URI |
|---|---|
| 04:21 | First injection seen, in the BBC's Optimizely snippet |
| 08:28 | The crypto clipper, track.js, first seen on bbc.com |
| 13:03 | Attacker moves stolen crypto to exchanges |
| 13:43 | Card skimmer added to the payload |
| 17:13 to 17:57 | Second iOS host and the Coruna exploit iframe added |
| 19:24 to 19:59 | Report URI sweep finds 186 of 1,611 snippets infected |
| 21:52 | 1 of 188 known snippets still infected |
Report URI says the payload was rebuilt 26 times during the day, and that the attacker's wallets had received about $7,040 by 19:25 UTC. It can't see how many card numbers or cookies reached the attacker.
What did the malicious code do?
- Crypto address swapping: replaced BTC, ETH and EVM, TRON, Solana, TON, LTC, BCH and DOGE addresses in page content, forms, the clipboard and outgoing requests.
- Card skimming (from 13:43 UTC): captured card number, expiry and CVV from forms on the page and sent them to
1688360.cc/card.php. Report URI says hosted payment iframes, such as Stripe and Adyen, were out of reach. - Cookie and screenshot theft: sent the page URL, non-HttpOnly cookies and an html2canvas screenshot to
1688360.cc/hit.php. - iOS exploit kits: loaded the Coruna kit for iOS 13 to 17 and DarkSword for iOS 18, and reloaded vulnerable pages every 60 seconds to retry.
Who was affected?
- Report URI found 188 infected snippets belonging to 178 organizations, out of 1,611 it checked, and expects the real number is higher.
- Named sites include Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM, Ledger, Peacock, Fox News, Virgin Media, Levi's, Starbucks Canada and Optimizely's own site.
- Banking and finance was the largest group at 32 organizations, followed by technology and SaaS (23) and retail (20).
- Snippets served from a customer's own domain, such as
opt.scheels.com, were affected too.
How to check if your site was affected
- Search the Project JavaScript and every experiment's custom code in Optimizely for
1688360.cc,atob(,window._k7and scripts you don't recognize. - Check historical CSP reports, script monitoring and browser logs for November 16. A clean snippet today doesn't show what your visitors received during the day.
- Search proxy, DNS and CSP report logs for the attacker domains:
1688360.cc,5vobauua3ojpklx.icu,eil786npto9u5bq.icu,l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo.icuandwebshell.lol. - Identify which pages loaded the snippet and took card details directly in the page, rather than in a hosted payment iframe.
What to do now
- Audit Optimizely users, API tokens and integrations that can edit project code, and rotate their credentials.
- Treat card details entered on your own pages on November 16 as potentially exposed, and work with your payment provider on next steps.
- Rotate any session tokens or secrets kept in non-HttpOnly cookies on affected pages.
- Block the attacker domains, including subdomains, at your proxy or DNS. The full IOC list, with file hashes, is in Report URI’s analysis.
- Tighten your Content Security Policy: restrict
connect-srcto the destinations you need, avoidunsafe-eval, and turn on reporting so a new script or destination shows up quickly. - Decide with legal and support whether to notify customers who used affected pages that day.
What the Optimizely incident means for third-party tags
A tag manager or experimentation snippet runs with the same access as your own code on every page that loads it, and the vendor can change it without a deploy on your side. Nothing in your repository changed here, so code review and dependency scanning had nothing to see, and subresource integrity isn't practical for a snippet the vendor rebuilds whenever an experiment changes. Report URI's CSP crawl found the payload blocked on only 24 of the organization sites it checked; on 17 more the payload ran but a strict connect-src stopped the data from leaving. Keep an inventory of which third-party scripts can run custom code, limit who can edit them, and monitor what browsers actually receive.
Where Nullify fits
How Nullify Covers This Class of Attack
The code was delivered at runtime by a third-party tag service, not from a package in your repositories, so there's no code change for Nullify to find. Script monitoring and a strict CSP are the controls here.
Frequently Asked Questions
Was Optimizely hacked?
Optimizely says an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in its Experimentation product on November 16, 2026 to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects. It says it has fixed the vulnerability, removed the code and secured affected accounts.
Which websites were affected by the Optimizely attack?
Report URI found malicious code in 188 Optimizely snippets belonging to 178 organizations, including Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax and Ledger. It says the real number is likely higher.
What did the Optimizely malware steal?
According to Report URI, it swapped cryptocurrency wallet addresses, skimmed card numbers and CVVs typed into page forms, sent cookies and screenshots to the attacker, and served iOS exploit kits to older iPhones and iPads.
What should I do if I visited an affected site on November 16?
Update your iPhone or iPad to iOS 18.7.3 or 26.3 or later, check that any crypto you sent reached the right address, and watch your card statements for charges you don't recognize.
Update Log
- Nov 17, 2026: page published from Report URI's analysis (Nov 16) and Optimizely's status update (Nov 17, 01:02 UTC).