What happened to openapi-react-query-codegen?
In its analysis, StepSecurity says the project's release workflow ran on issue_comment events for pull requests whose body matched "npm publish" and never checked the commenter's role. It had id-token: write, checked out the pull request head and published through npm Trusted Publishing. On August 28, 2026, an outside GitHub user opened pull requests that triggered it, with no maintainer password or npm token needed.
The ten resulting versions carry a preinstall hook that runs node 3FWCvzduYZg.js. StepSecurity says the payload downloads Bun into /tmp/trinnyyyy-*, runs gh auth token and git credential-manager, enumerates processes and probes cloud metadata. The OSV entry advises treating any machine that installed the package as fully compromised.
Which versions are affected?
- Malicious: 0.5.4, 0.5.5, 1.6.3, 1.6.4, 2.2.1, 2.2.2, 3.0.3, 3.0.4 and two
0.0.0-prerelease builds. - Clean versions to pin: 0.5.3, 1.6.2, 2.2.0 and 3.0.2.
- Any machine or CI runner that installed a malicious version with lifecycle scripts enabled.
How to check if you're affected
- Search lockfiles, SBOMs, CI logs and caches for the malicious versions of
@7nohe/openapi-react-query-codegen. - Look for
3FWCvzduYZg.js,binding.gyp,/tmp/trinnyyyy-*/bunand/tmp/*/updater.pyon build machines. - Check install logs for unexpected Bun execution or GitHub API traffic during
npm install.
What to do now
- Stop builds and isolate systems that installed an affected version.
- From a clean machine, rotate npm, GitHub, cloud, CI/CD, SSH, signing and deployment credentials, and review audit logs.
- Pin a clean version, delete caches and discard artifacts built on exposed runners.
- If you maintain packages, require a maintainer role check on any comment-triggered workflow and never check out untrusted pull request code in a job with publishing permissions.
Why trusted publishing didn't stop this
Trusted Publishing proves which workflow published a package. It doesn't prove the workflow was safe to run. Here the workflow itself would publish whatever an outsider's pull request contained, so the malicious releases carried the same provenance as real ones. Treat publish workflows as production code: restrict their triggers, check who can start them, and keep untrusted code out of any job that holds an id-token or registry credentials.
Where Nullify fits
How Nullify Covers This Class of Attack
Nullify finds every repository and container image that pulls an affected package version and runs the upgrade as one campaign, scoped by CVE, package, repo or team, with owners, Slack escalation and SLA tracking. Your developers approve every merge.
Nullify can't tell you whether the payload ran on a given machine or runner. Use the checks above for that, then fix the dependency everywhere it appears.
Frequently Asked Questions
Which openapi-react-query-codegen versions are malicious?
Ten versions published August 28, 2026, including 0.5.4, 0.5.5, 1.6.3, 1.6.4, 2.2.1, 2.2.2, 3.0.3 and 3.0.4. Clean versions to pin are 0.5.3, 1.6.2, 2.2.0 and 3.0.2.
How was openapi-react-query-codegen compromised?
Its release workflow ran when anyone commented on a pull request that mentioned npm publish, without checking the commenter's role. An outside user triggered it to publish malicious versions through npm Trusted Publishing, with no stolen password or token.
What should I do if I installed a malicious version?
Treat the machine as compromised. From a clean computer, rotate npm, GitHub, cloud and CI credentials, review audit logs, delete caches, discard artifacts built on exposed runners and pin a clean version.
Update Log
- Nov 17, 2026: page published from the primary sources linked above.