What is GPUStack CVE-2026-102895?
GPUStack's security advisory says requests that appear to come from 127.0.0.1 are promoted to the built-in admin when force_auth_localhost is false, which is the default. That happens behind any same-host reverse proxy, or when a client sends a forged X-GPUStack-Real-IP: 127.0.0.1 header. The result is full unauthenticated admin: changing users and models, minting persistent admin API keys, reading worker and cloud secrets, and running code through custom inference backends.
The advisory says exploitation was observed in the wild against a 2.1.1 deployment, where attackers created custom inference backends that ran reverse shells. CISA added CVE-2026-102895 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on November 9, 2026, with a November 12 due date. GitHub rates it CVSS 3.1 9.8.
Who is affected by the GPUStack bypass?
- GPUStack versions before 2.2.0 with
force_auth_localhostset to false, the default. - Deployments behind a same-host reverse proxy, such as
proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:<port>. - Deployments that accept a client-supplied
X-GPUStack-Real-IPheader.
How to check if you're affected
- Run
pip show gpustackto find the installed version. - Check whether GPUStack sits behind a reverse proxy on the same host and whether the proxy passes
X-GPUStack-Real-IPfrom clients. - Review custom inference backends, admin API keys with scope
*and user accounts for anything you didn't create.
What to do now
- Upgrade to GPUStack 2.2.0 or later.
- Set
force_auth_localhost=true. - Strip client-supplied
X-GPUStack-Real-IPheaders at the edge, and make sure the proxy can't make external traffic look like loopback. - Keep the GPUStack API off untrusted networks, behind a VPN or edge authentication.
Why trusting localhost breaks behind a proxy
Many services treat requests from 127.0.0.1 as trusted, assuming only local processes can make them. Put a reverse proxy on the same host and every external request arrives from 127.0.0.1. Trust decisions should rest on authentication, not on source address or a header the client can set. Check your own services for the same pattern, especially admin endpoints added for local tooling.
Where Nullify fits
How Nullify Covers This Class of Attack
Nullify's code analysis looks for authentication and authorization failures, including privilege escalation and business-logic flaws, on every pull request, and the AI pentest agent tests authenticated REST and GraphQL API flows. This is about the same class of bug in your code, not the vendor's.
GPUStack is a dependency you deploy, and the flaw is an authentication bypass, a bug class worth checking for in your own services too.
Frequently Asked Questions
Which GPUStack version fixes CVE-2026-102895?
GPUStack 2.2.0. Also set force_auth_localhost to true and strip client-supplied X-GPUStack-Real-IP headers at your proxy, because any version that trusts loopback requests is exposed behind a same-host proxy.
How was GPUStack exploited?
The advisory says attackers reached a 2.1.1 deployment as admin through the loopback trust and created custom inference backends that ran reverse shells. Review backends, admin API keys and users on any exposed instance.
Is CVE-2026-102895 exploited in the wild?
Yes. CISA added CVE-2026-102895 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on November 9, 2026, which means it has evidence of active exploitation. It gave US federal civilian agencies until November 12 to fix it. Treat exposed GPUStack instances as urgent.
Update Log
- Nov 17, 2026: page published from the primary sources linked above.