What happened in the GhostAction campaign?
In its analysis, GitGuardian says the GhostAction campaign resumed on August 31, 2026, pushing a github_actions_security.yml workflow into 772 public repositories across 373 users and organizations by September 30 and targeting 2,577 secrets. It counted 3,669 workflow runs, of which 499 executed, and confirmed 26 secrets exfiltrated from 13 repositories.
On October 8, StepSecurity reports, two high-profile maintainer accounts swept 345 repositories with a security-audit.yml workflow that also mines full git history with git log -p --all for AWS, AI provider, GitHub, GitLab, Slack and other credentials. GitGuardian's October update counts more than 30,000 repositories targeted by about 1,900 compromised accounts between October 8 and 12. GitHub began preventing the workflow from running on October 9.
Who is affected by GhostAction?
- Repositories where a GhostAction workflow ran: any completed run should be treated as confirmed exfiltration.
- Every credential ever committed to any branch of those repositories, because later variants read full git history.
- The GitHub accounts whose credentials pushed the workflows.
How to check if you're affected
- Search
.github/workflowsforgithub_actions_security.yml,security-audit.ymlandsecurity-check.yml, and for the stringsAKIA_CTX_STARTandc=monami. - Look for commits titled "Add Github Actions Security workflow" or "Add security audit workflow".
- Review workflow runs since August 31, 2026 and egress to 193.32.204.199 on ports 80 and 3000.
What to do now
- Rotate every Actions secret and every credential ever committed to any branch of an affected repository.
- Find and revoke the GitHub credential that pushed the workflow.
- Delete the workflow from all branches and forks, and don't cut releases until the repository is clean.
- Require approval for workflow runs from outside contributors and protect
.github/workflowswith branch protection.
Why full-history scanning raises the stakes
Removing a secret from the latest commit doesn't remove it from git history. The later GhostAction variants read every commit on every branch, so credentials developers deleted months ago became targets again. Scan history as well as the working tree, and treat any secret that ever reached a shared repository as one that needs rotating, not just deleting.
Where Nullify fits
How Nullify Covers This Class of Attack
Nullify finds credentials in code and verifies which ones still work with the provider that issued them (AWS, GCP, Azure, GitHub, GitLab, Stripe and Slack), so live keys rank first, then routes rotation to each owner. Rotation happens with the provider; Nullify doesn't rotate keys.
Nullify doesn't detect whether a workflow ran in your CI. Use the checks above for that, then work through which leaked keys still work.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is GhostAction?
GhostAction is a campaign that uses stolen GitHub credentials to push secret-stealing GitHub Actions workflows into repositories. It resumed on August 31, 2026, and GitGuardian counts more than 30,000 repositories targeted between October 8 and 12.
How do I check if GhostAction hit my repository?
Search workflows for github_actions_security.yml, security-audit.yml and security-check.yml, look for commits titled Add Github Actions Security workflow, and review workflow runs since August 31, 2026 and traffic to 193.32.204.199.
Is deleting the GhostAction workflow enough?
No. Treat any completed run as confirmed exfiltration and rotate every Actions secret, plus any credential ever committed to the repository. Also find and revoke the GitHub credential that pushed the workflow, or it can be used again.
Update Log
- Nov 17, 2026: page published from the primary sources linked above.