What happened in the Gheist campaign?
In its research, Wiz says it tracked a tool it named Gheist from September 15, 2026. For every repository a stolen token can reach, the tool commits .github/workflows/sync-check.yml to a ci-sync-XXXXXX branch with the message "ci: sync config", authored as the token's owner. The workflow prints secrets base32-encoded into the run log to get around masking, downloads the log and deletes the run within seconds.
Wiz counts more than 13,500 planted branches across more than 850 compromised accounts. GitHub's approval hold for public repositories stopped every public run Wiz checked, but private repositories and GitHub Enterprise Server were exposed, and cloud logs showed attacker branches assuming AWS roles. On October 19 a self-hosted runner job was added that hunts tokens, keys, Terraform state and cloud metadata credentials.
Who is affected by Gheist?
- Private repositories and GitHub Enterprise Server instances reachable by a stolen token, where the approval hold didn't apply.
- Every repository, organization and environment secret available to a repository where a sync-check run completed.
- Self-hosted runners that ran a
ci-syncbranch job, and their instance roles.
How to check if you're affected
- Search for branches matching
ci-sync-plus six characters that contain only a workflow file and the commit "ci: sync config". - In audit logs, look for
ci-sync-*runs deleted within a minute of completing, and API activity with agheistuser agent. - Check cloud audit logs for role assumptions whose subject includes a
ci-sync-branch, and self-hosted runners for.gdmp_patand.gdmp_sweepfiles.
What to do now
- Rotate every repository, organization and environment secret available to affected repositories. Deleting the run doesn't remove the exposure.
- Revoke the tokens that pushed the branches and check their owners' devices for infostealers.
- Treat self-hosted runners that ran a
ci-syncjob, and their instance roles, as compromised. - Don't approve held sync-check runs, and require approval for workflows from new branches in private repositories.
Why OIDC roles need branch conditions
Gheist's branches assumed cloud roles because the roles trusted any workflow in the repository. Scope GitHub OIDC trust policies to specific branches, environments and workflows, so a workflow on an attacker-created branch can't assume a production role. The same check limits what any compromised token can reach through CI.
Where Nullify fits
How Nullify Covers This Class of Attack
Nullify finds credentials in code and verifies which ones still work with the provider that issued them (AWS, GCP, Azure, GitHub, GitLab, Stripe and Slack), so live keys rank first, then routes rotation to each owner. Rotation happens with the provider; Nullify doesn't rotate keys.
Nullify doesn't detect whether a workflow ran in your CI. Use the checks above for that, then work through which leaked keys still work.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is Gheist?
Gheist is Wiz's name for a tool that uses stolen GitHub tokens to plant sync-check workflows on ci-sync branches. The workflows dump CI secrets into logs, which the tool downloads before deleting the run. Wiz tracked it from September 15, 2026.
Were public repositories affected by Gheist?
Wiz says GitHub's approval hold blocked every public-repository run it checked. Private repositories and GitHub Enterprise Server instances were exposed, and some attacker branches assumed AWS roles.
What should I rotate after Gheist?
Every repository, organization and environment secret available to an affected repository, plus the tokens that pushed the branches. Treat self-hosted runners that ran a ci-sync job, and their cloud roles, as compromised.
Update Log
- Nov 17, 2026: page published from the primary sources linked above.